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Chapter Three:
The Virtue of Civility in the Practice
of Politics
This chapter has more than one goal. First, I want to introduce
readers to the apparatus of practices, institutions and virtues (PIV) that
helps us understand what virtues are. Second, I want to explore the
notion of politics a little, to see what its main problem is. (I will claim,
perhaps surprisingly, that business management is largely a variation of
politics.) Third, I want to reintroduce civility and suggest that it is an
important contributor to solving the political problem (and problems of
management).
Throughout this chapter, I will emphasize process. As we shall see,
process is integrated in more than one way into the whole structure of
virtues, as we learn what virtues are and as we train ourselves in them.
Already, in chapter one, I suggested that controversies are processes in
which we can seek truth. The writing and reading of books constitute
another process in which we can seek truth. I hope that the things I
write here will contribute to a wider discussion of the virtue of civility,
a discussion which may promote truth, even if the particular ideas I
espouse here turn out to be wrong.
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Practices, Institutions and Virtues
1. Practices. Most of what I want to say in this section is based on
chapter 14, "The Nature of the Virtues," in Alasdair Macintyre's book,
After Virtue. Part of what Macintyre has to say in his book is that
virtues can only be understood in a socially constructed context.
Virtues make sense against a background of "practices."

By a "practice" I am going to mean any coherent and complex
form of socially established cooperative human activity through which
goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying
to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended. 1
Note, first, that by this definition practices are complex and
cooperative forms of human activity. Macintyre says that throwing a
football with skill is not a practice, but playing football is. Planting
turnips is not a practice; farming is. Tic-tac-toe is not a practice, but
2
physics, chemistry, biology, history, painting and music all are. •
Note also that according to the definition a practice a1ms at
achieving "goods internal to that form of activity." An internal good is
one that is made possible only by the particular practice that produces it
or some other very similar practice. An external good may be gained
by success in a practice, but it may also be gained in ot~er wa~s.
Macintyre illustrates the difference with a story of a bnght child
learning to play chess. At first, the child doesn't really want to learn
chess, so an adult promises a reward of a bit of candy if the child plays,
and a bit more if the child wins. (The adult promises to play at a level
where the child can win, but only if she plays as well as she can.) The
candy motivates the child to play and to learn to play better. The candy
is an external good; it is not an intrinsic part of chess, and as long as the
candy alone motivates the child, the child has no reason not to win by
cheating. But the adult hopes that the child will come to have other
reasons for playing chess. She will discover goods that only chess
makes possible: a particular kind of analytic skill, strategic imagination,
competitive intensity, etc. She will come to value chess for its internal
goods and she will come to see that cheating, though it may gain her
'
3
external goods, destroys the internal goods of chess.
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Notice, in this example, that we say the child "comes to" value
chess, that she "comes to" see that cheating ruins chess. These insights
don't happen all at once, no more than skill in chess is gained all at
once. The beginner gains both skill and insight by a process of training
in a practice.
- · The internal goods of a practice can only be gained through that
practice (or another practice of the same type), and to a large degree
( they are only recognizable by people who have gained a measure of
\ competence in the practice. Non~chess players may not recogni~e the
internal goods of chess that motivate chess players. People w1thout
relevant experience cannot judge the internal goods of a practice.
2. Institutions. Macintyre warns us not to confuse practices with
institutions. Institutions are human organizations that grow up around
a practice and make it possible. Playing chess is a practice; chess
clubs, companies which publish chess literature or produce chess sets,
chess clocks and other paraphernalia, and national and international
chess organizations are all institutions.
Institutions control external goods related to practices. Typically,
external goods include money, prestige, and status. But institutions
cannot control the internal goods of a practice. Chess institutions can
recognize so-and-so as a master level player; they can award a prize to
so-and-so as winner of some competition; and they can declare so-andso to be city, regional, national or world champion . But chess
institutions are unable to give anyone the internal goods peculiar to a
well-played game.
Because institutions control external goods but not internal goods,
Macintyre points out that institutions are always susceptible to
"corruption." An institution becomes corrupt to the extent that it so
focuses attention on external goods that it fails to enable the relevant
practice to achieve internal goods. When the participants in a practice
focus their attention on external goods of money and prestige granted
by some institution, the practice in which they engage and the goods
internal to that practice may suffer. Consider an artist who paints,
sings, dances, or acts to achieve fame or wealth rather than excellence.
External goods and internal goods may be achieved together, but in
some cases they are incompatible; the virtues that enable one to gain
the goods internal to the practice may prevent one from gaining
external goods. 4
(E.g., the honesty of a really good lawyer may
prevent her from winning certain external rewards, but the internal
goods of a practice of law cannot be had without that honesty.)
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Institutions may be short-lived, such as a weekend chess
tournament; they may endure as organizations far longer than any of
the human beings involved in them, as with professional or scientific
associations like the American Medical Association.
What we call business is not a single practice, though we might
think of business as a group of practices. Retailing clothing is a
practice, as is producing beverages, providing nursing care, and
thousands of other businesses. Each of these practices is a complex,
cooperative human endeavor that has its own internal standards of
excellence. Each of them exists to achieve internal goods made
possible only by the practice. Through the institutions associated with
these practices we also gain external goods, money in particular. We
often focus on the external rewards of a job, but if that is all there is to
a job-if there are no internal goods achieved by anyone
involved-then the activity ceases to be a practice. And it's probably
dehumanizing.
3. Virtues. With a description of practices and institutions in place,
Macinyre can give an initial definition of virtues.

the beginner involves herself in a community-through-time defined by
that practice.
It is already clear, says Macintyre, that some virtues are needed in
all practices: justice, courage, and honesty. 6 If the standards of
excellence in some practice are not applied justly (suppose a teacher
granted grades on the basis of personal appearance), the internal goods
of the practice are undermined. (There are internal goods to the
practice of education, and students need just feedback to improve.) For
a practice to adapt over time, some of its practitioners have to challenge
some of its methods and standards, and it takes courage to suggest that
we think and act in new ways. Without at least a minimal level of
honesty, people cannot cooperate in a practice at all.
To be sure, some people engage in practices with little virtue (and
much vice). By their lack of courage, justice or honesty, they may gain
many external goods-and external goods are real goods, so we can
understand why vice is tempting. But such people are, in a sense, free
riders. They are parasitical on the system. At least some people
engaged in a practice must exhibit at least some level of courage,
honesty, and justice, or else the practice will cease to produce the
internal goods for which it exists.
Courage, honesty, and justice are not the only virtues, obviously.
Perhaps every practice needs other "acquired human qualities" to
achieve its internal goods. Readers are free to imagine the acquired
characteristics that enable success in the practices with which they are
familiar.
One more aspect of the structure of practices, institutions and
virtues must be mentioned. As Maclnyre defines them, virtues depend
on practices. But what about evil human practices? Should we say that
the "acquired human qualities" which helped produce "success" in the
complex and cooperative human endeavor known as Auschwitz were
"virtues"? We recognize that Nazi soldiers were brave, but does that
make their courage right?7
Macintyre's answer lies in the notion of te/os. A telos of a thing is
the purpose or goal for which it exists. Every practice has a telos, and
it is by pursuing that goal that people gain the internal goods of the
practice. At first, a beginner may not have a good grasp of the purpose
of a practice; he may participate mainly to gain external goods. After a
while, as he participates in institutions that maintain the practice and
gains skills and virtues necessary for success in the practice, the telos
becomes more clear to him.

A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession of which tends to
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the
lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods. 5

Note, here, that virtues are acquired characteristics. Macintyre's
definition rules out things such as natural physical strength or beauty.
However much these things are prized, they are not moral virtues.
Acquiring a quality requires a process of learning or training.
Beginners in some practice may not have the virtues necessary for
success in that practice, and one measure of their increasing success in
the practice will be their acquisition of the relevant virtues.
Now, to engage in a practice means to submit to an ongoing human
activity (that is, unless one were to invent a totally new practice on
one's own). Beginners don't get to do just anything they like and call it
architecture or gardening. Beginners have to learn the practice, and this
involves learning its skills, procedures, and standards of excellence.
Once the beginner has become competent in the practice, she may
challenge some of the methods and standards of the practice, but only
after she has gained a measure of expertise in the practice as she
inherited it. All practices have histories, and the skills and standards of
a practice evolve over time. In learning and participating in a practice,
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The notion of telos applies not just to practices, but also to a
person's whole life. Here Macintyre defends an Aristotelian view of
things . We must ask: what is the purpose (telos) of a human life? It is
possible that we could come to the conclusion that some practices are
incompatible with a good life.
Remember process here. The competent practitioners of some
practice may disagree over the precise formulation of the goal of their
practice. Consider driving. In a class exercise I have sometimes
suggested that the purpose of driving is "safe and timely arrival." But
other competent drivers- there are millions of us- say that driving is
also about having fun. We need not reach final agreement about the
telos of driving to recognize that some attitudes and behaviors of
drivers partake of vice (tailgating, inattentiveness, etc.) while others are
virtues (e.g. patience). Part of what it means to engage in a practice is
to engage in the debate over the goals and standards of excellence of
that practice. The practice evolves over time.
In the same way, Macintyre suggests that a healthy community
would involve its members in a debate over the details of the good life.
In fact, part of the good life is the search for the good life, and some
8
virtues are virtues because they help us sustain that search.
A healthy
community would continue to debate just what the proper human telos
is, but it could exclude certain things as inimical to the human telos,
even broadly understood. People who are reasonably competent in the
practice of political philosophy can agree that running concentration
camps is not compatible with the good life, even if they are still arguing
over how to best understand the good life.

decisions must be made in the context of conflict, and it is often
thought, wrongly, that political decisions ought to eliminate conflict.
The goal of politics can't be the elimination of conflict, because
some conflict helps produce better decisions for the people involved.
Many writers on business management have pointed out that in some
circumstances, lack of conflict causes as much difficulty as too much
conflict. Decision-making bodies afflicted with "group think" have too
little conflict. Everyone in the group sees the question before them in
similar ways, so each one readily agrees to the first policy proposal
offered, and other, possibly better, solutions are not considered. Wise
leaders will sometimes deliberately foster conflicting views in the
decision making body-as when a conservative president includes
liberals in his cabinet, or vice versa- in order to produce more creative
thinking, and thus better decisions.
If the goal of politics isn't the elimination of conflict, what is it? On
a superficial level, I just identified the goal of politics as "better
decisions." But what are better decisions? How do we tell good
political decisions from bad ones? How do we tell good political
decisions from even better ones? We are asking what the telos of
politics is.
I suggest that the telos of politics is shalom. This biblical Hebrew
word means "peace," but also much more. It involves harmony,
completeness, integrity, and wholeness. In a community of shalom no
one starves, because shalom includes physical contentedness. In a
community of shalom no one despairs, because shalom includes
psychological health. In a community of shalom no one faces his
problems alone, because shalom includes solidarity. And so on. 9
Clearly, in using shalom to describe the political telos, I am
describing a goal toward which we move, not something that any
society has achieved. Remember what was said earlier about the
process of understanding the good life. We do not simply turn to our
pastor or rabbi or professor to tell us what shalom means (though we
should listen eagerly to what his or her expertise might teach us); all of
us who competently participate in politics participate also in the debate
about the goal of politics. Part of the good life is discovering what the
good life is; part of shalom is discovering what shalom is. We engage
in the process of discovery as members of an ongoing community,
inheriting central ideas from previous generations, but reforming those
ideas in a continual search for truth.
As we search together to understand shalom and move toward it, I
think we will find that some conflict is necessary to shalom. A variety

The Problem of Politics
To begin, recall the definition of "politics" I offered in the last
chapter; politics is the art or science of making decisions for groups of
people. Thus defined, politics includes family politics, university
politics, business politics, church politics, and governmental politics
from small town meetings to the U.S. Congress or the U.N. General
Assembly. Whenever a group of people needs to decide what they
believe or what they will do, the political problem emerges.
The political problem has to do with conflict. As the joke goes
(which I have heard told about Quakers and other groups), where two
or three are gathered, there are three or four opinions. People often do
not agree about what they believe, or about what to do. So political
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of views, vigorously promoted, makes conflict. Out of that conflict
comes creativity and new options, options that none of the parties to the
conflict had considered. Sometimes, only creative options will move
us toward shalom.
Of course, I hardly need to say that some conflict, or the way we
handle some conflict, is destructive. Practices of all sorts- gardening,
commodity trading, clothing manufacture, research in organic
chemistry, etc.-depend on institutions to sustain them. All those
institutions provide situations for politics. And all of those institutions
are susceptible to destructive conflict, usually as people pursue external
goods. 10 Sometimes the institution itself is destroyed, and sometimes
the institution continues while the practice involved is reduced to
producing merely external goods. More importantly, sometimes the
conflict destroys people.
One could say that the theoretical problem of moral philosophy in
regard to politics is distinguishing destructive conflicts from
constructive conflicts. (One might even go so far as to put it this way:
distinguishing loving conflict from hateful conflict. But this would
sidetrack our discussion with complications. 11 ) The practical problem
of politics is to respond to conflict in ways that contribute to shalom
rather than reduce it. How do we conduct our controversies in ways
that move us toward truth?
The institutions that most dominate our lives-our businesses,
schools, churches, and governments-all exist to sustain practices. In
all these institutions we must deal with conflict. If we handle conflict
well, the institutions will better sustain the practices and the internal
goods at which they aim. So I suggest that the principle problem of
business management is a political problem, the management of
conflict.

since people engage in it in the service of institutions which themselves
exist to sustain "first level" practices.
Illustration: a pharmacist engages in the first level practice of
providing pharmacological services to the public. He gains external
rewards (income, local recognition) and achieves internal goods (at
which I can only guess) which pharmacists know. He participates in
several institutions that sustain the practice of pharmacy: his own store,
a drug supply cooperative, and a state pharmacists' association. In each
of these institutions he joins others in making group decisions; he
participates in the second level practice of politics. Perhaps he
participates in politics only for external goods (he wants recognition by
HMOs for his store), but he may also gain goods internal to the
political process (a sense of empowerment, perhaps, or a feeling that he
has defended his values by urging the pharmacists' association to
oppose assisted suicide).
I suppose there are many virtues (acquired characteristics which
tend to enable acquisition of internal goods) of politics: courage,
honesty, justice, creativity, hope, practical judgment, etc. Among these
virtues is civility.
Remember from the last chapter the definition of civility I
suggested. Civility is a properly grounded character trait that moves
an individual to treat political opponents well and/or to feel certain
emotions toward political opponents, emotions that move an individual
to treat political opponents well. A few comments on this definition
will help make it clearer. 13 First, civility is directed toward one's
political opponents; I suppose we should be civil to our political allies
as well, but that's easier. Second, civility moves us to treat our political
opponents "well"; that is, we shouldn't impugn their motives, lie about
them, use ad-hominem or other fallacious arguments against them, or
ignore them; and we should keep our agreements with them, debate
honestly with them, and respect them. Third, civility is a character
trait, not merely an action or collection of actions. Civility, as other
virtues, describes who a person is, not just what she does. Last, note
that civility is "properly grounded"; this requires explanation.
Virtues have to do not just with a person's observable actions, but
also his motivations for those actions. Aristotle illustrated the point by
imagining different soldiers, all standing in battle line, doing what a
brave man does, but each exhibiting some kind of pseudo-courage. For
instance, the ignorant man fought with no understanding that battles
could be dangerous, the professional soldier fought because he was
experienced and calculating, and the citizen soldier fought to achieve

The Virtue of Civility in the Practice of Politics
Remember Macintyre's definition of a virtue: "an acquired human
quality the possession of which tends to enable us to achieve those
goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively
prevents us from achieving any such goods."
Now I want to suggest that politics, as defined in the previous
chapter-the art or science of making decisions for groups of
people-is a practice. 12 We might call it a "second level" practice,
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recognition from his fellow citizens. None of these men, Aristotle said,
exhibited true courage. In a similar way, I imagine that people could
treat their political opponents well for the wrong reasons. Perhaps, like
the ignorant soldier, they don't understand that civility has its dangers .
Or, like the professional soldier, they calculate that treating one's
opponent well is the best way to achieve their goals. These sorts of
civility will wilt in certain circumstances-when the cost of civility
becomes apparent, when treating an opponent well may produce
political defeat.
Now, just what the proper ground for civility is is not the subject of
14
this chapter.
Process again: while still pressing for agreement about
the basis for civility, we can agree that it describes an important virtue,
and we can explore the ways it tends toward achieving the internal
goods of politics. There are at least four advantages which civility
contributes to the practice of politics.
First, civility helps prevent destructive conflict. Remember the
plaintive words of Rodney King, after the acquittal of the police
officers who beat him and the riot that followed. "People, I just want to
say, you know, can we all get along? . .. I mean, we're all stuck here
for a while. Let's try to work it out." 15 Riots show us how destructive
conflict can be; surely we want to avoid that. But political conflict
with less fury and on a smaller scale (maybe it is "only" verbal, on a
work team or at town council) can still be destructive of institutions and
the practices institutions sustain.
Second, civility helps preserve participants in a political process as
resources for decision-making. An important turn comes when we stop
seeing the political opponent as merely an obstacle or a naysayer and
see the opponent as a resource for better decision-making. My political
opponent sees the issue differently than I do. He may have information
or values or concerns that I don't know about. (I may think I already
know all about his reasons for opposing my position, but I probably
don't.) If I treat my opponent well, his knowledge, values, and
concerns remain available as resources for inventing new options. If I
have the power to do so, and if I cut my opponent out of the decision
process, I effectively reduce my resources for making a good decision.
Third, civility helps reduce distortions in communication. Political
processes, whether the institution is a hospital or computer chip
company, depend on communication. Nothing fouls up communication
quite as effectively as enmity. It breeds fear, mistrust, lies, and
manipulation. But the virtue of civility expresses itself in treating
opponents well. This feature of civility is so important that people have

invented rules of order and etiquette (sometimes formally adopted in
written form) to preserve it. Rules, though, are not enough; we need
the actual virtue, the character trait which motivates proper behavior.
Fourth, civility helps preserve participants in politics as people of
dignity. Which is more important, defeating Mrs. Brown's silly
proposal to paint the church nursery walls brown, or treating Mrs.
Brown herself as a person of worth? A civil person may oppose Mrs.
Brown's ideas, but he will do so without opposing Mrs. Brown.
The practice of politics is only one part of a person's life. This last
advantage of civility looks beyond politics and connects a person's
character as a political actor with her character in the whole of life. If
we limit ourselves to the confines of a single practice, politics, the
political opponent is a priceless resource, so civility is a virtue. In the
context of one's whole life, the political opponent turns out to be a
human being, worthy of even more respect, so this fourth advantage of
civility is most important of all.
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A Caution
We should be clear-minded about the costs of civility. A candidate
who treats his opponent well may lose the election . (Attack ads,
especially when delivered on television late in an election campaign,
are distressingly successful. Nevertheless, the civil candidate will
eschew them.) A university that treats other schools fairly may see
them gain students at its expense. A mid-level manager who treats
other managers in his firm well may lose rewards and prestige to an
unscrupulous colleague.
In short: if you treat your opponent well, he might beat you. He
might not be interested in better decisions. He might treat politics as a
win-lose proposition. You can invite him to participate in politics more
competently- that is, more virtuously- but there are people who have
not been well trained in politics and who seem to think its telos is
winning. You may find training such people in the true purpose of
politics a long, difficult business.
Nevertheless, I contend that civility is a real virtue. If we cultivate
it in ourselves, we will more readily reap the internal goods of politics.
We will make progress toward shalom.
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